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INDIAN LAW 
THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE: THE 
REPORTS OF ITS DEATH HAVE BEEN 
GREATLY EXAGGERATED 
LESTER J. MARSTON* AND DAVID A. FINK** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to "regulate 
commerce with the Indian Tribes"l has been frequently cited as 
a source of the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs.2 In 
recent times, however, the federal courts have shied away from 
opportunities to explore the "negative" implications of that 
clause which, by analogy to the interstate and foreign commerce 
provisions of the same clause, necessarily flow from the Indian 
commerce clause. Rather, the courts have relied upon preemp-
tion and other analytic models to gauge the limits of state au-
thority on Indian reservations. 
An analytic model based on the negative implications of the 
Indian commerce clause has never been foreclosed by the Su-
preme Court. The Court has merely remarked that such a model 
is unnecessary, since existing models give adequate guidance to 
* Directing Attorney, California Indian Legal Services (Ukiah Office); Partner, Rap-
port, Marston & Quesenberry; City Attorney, Willits, California; J.D. 1977 Hastings Col-
lege of the Law. Mr. Marston was counsel for the tribe in Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. 
Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), rev'd 757 
F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985), discussed at length 
herein. 
** Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988. 
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
2. See, e.g., United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194-95 (1876). 
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lower courts and are sufficiently sensitive to tribal interests.3 Al-
though the commerce clause has not been used in recent times 
to invalidate state regulation of Indians, the value and efficacy 
of such an approach merits consideration in light of the tremen-
dous expansion in the number and variety of commercial activi-
ties pursued by tribal entities on tribal lands. The operation of 
tribal business enterprises, and the assertion of tribal regulatory 
and taxing authority over such businesses, increases the likeli-
hood that such tribal action will conflict with the laws of the 
state in which the reservation is located. 
Furthermore, the federal government actively encourages 
and facilitates such tribal commercial activities in an effort to 
promote tribal self-sufficiency.' Tribal business enterprises are 
also heavily regulated by Congress, under the authority of the 
commerce clause. It seems particularly appropriate therefore, 
that the limits on state authority over Indian commerce be de-
fined within a framework which considers not only the special, 
quasi-sovereign status of an Indian tribe, but also the provisions 
of the Constitution which vest authority over Indian commerce 
solely with the federal legislature. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
An examination of the history behind the adoption of the 
Indian commerce clause is crucial to an understanding of the 
clause and to the effect the framers intended it to have. The 
history strongly indicates that the clause was intended to na-
tionalize political and economic relations with the Indian tribes 
and preempt state authority over those relations. This central 
theme pervades the evolution of the commitment of powers over 
Indian affairs to Congress. 
A. INDIAN COMMERCE UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
The perceived need for uniform national power to govern 
relations and trade with the Indian tribes dates back to the colo-
nial period and is even more firmly grounded on an historical 
basis than is national control of interstate or foreign commerce. 
3. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982). 
4. See infra text accompanying note 107. 
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Before the Revolution, both the colonists and the Crown recog-
nized and supported the need for unified national management 
of Indian affairs.1I In this vulnerable period of history, given the 
hostilities with Great Britain, the United States was particularly 
anxious to promote friendly relations with the tribes. At that 
time, the tribes were militarily powerful and posed an imminent 
threat to the fledgling United States government.6 Thus, the reg-
ulation of relationships with the Indian tribes was as important 
to the United States then, as regulation of trade and commerce 
with the Soviet Union is today. 
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation expressly 
granted to Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of 
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians 
not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative 
right of any state within its limits be not infringed or violated."7 
The uneasy and ambiguous compromise reflected in these 
provisos plagued the efficient regulation of Indian affairs 
throughout the period of the Articles of Confederation.8 
The competing assertion of state authority over Indian af-
fairs caused a serious deterioration of relations with the Indian 
tribes between 1786 and 1787. The potential for Indian war had 
seriously escalated in Georgia and North Carolina as a result of 
unsuccessful state efforts to manage Indian affairs.9 In response 
to these problems, a committee of the Continental Congress rec-
ommended in August 1787 the complete and undivided federal 
control over Indian affairs.lo Of primary concern to this commit-
tee, were not only the relations between the states and the Indi-
5. See generally F. Prucha, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS, ch. 1 
(1962) (discussion of the goals of colonial and imperial Indian policy prior to 
independence). 
6. See generally id. ch. 2 (discussion of the formation of Indian policy by the Conti-
nental Congress under the Articles of Confederation). 
7. Articles of Confederation, art. IX. 
8. See Committee Report, 33 Js. CONT'L CONGo 454, 457-58 (1787). Three states, 
Georgia, North Carolina and New York, claimed power to regulate economic relations 
with the tribes, and Georgia even attempted to negotiate a treaty with the tribes during 
this period. These states predicated their assertions of state authority on the claim that 
Indian tribes within their boundaries were "members" of the state, and therefore, sub-
ject to state, not federal, authority. Id. 
9. See 34 Js. CONT'L. CONGo 182-83 (1787); 32 Js. CONT'L. CONGo 365-69 (1787); 30 Js. 
CONT'L. CONGo 372-74 (1787). 
10. Committee Report, 33 Js. CONT'L. CONGo at 458-59. 
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ans in general, but also those problems that arose when a state 
attempted to govern these relations.l1 The committee empha-
sized that national "Indian policy" had been directed at such 
items as the making of war and peace, the purchase of tribal 
lands, the fixing of boundaries between the tribes and the state 
governments, and other matters concerning primarily political 
relations. 12 
11. Id. The committee found that the greatest source of difficulties with the tribes 
at that time arose because of misunderstandings concerning the meaning of Article IX of 
the Articles of Confederation and because of states' interference with the political rela-
tions with the tribes. 
[Blut there is another circumstance far more embarrassing, 
and that is the clause in the confederation relative to manag-
ing all affairs with the Indians, etc., is differently construed by 
Congress and the two States within whose limits the said 
tribes and disputed lands are. The construction contended for 
by those States, if right, appears to the committee, to leave 
the federal powers, in this case, a nullity; and to make it to-
tally uncertain on what principle Congress is to interfere be-
tween them and the said tribes; The States not only contend 
for this construction, but have actually pursued measures in 
conformity to it. North Carolina has undertaken to assign land 
to the Cherokees, and Georgia has proceeded to treat with the 
Creeks concerning peace, lands, and other objects, usually the 
principle ones in almost every treaty with the Indians. This 
construction appears to the Committee not only to be produc-
tive of confusion, disputes and embarrassment in managing af-
fairs with the Independent tribes within the limits of the 
States, but by no means the true one. 
Id. at 457-58. 
12. Id. at 458-59. The committee observed that: 
the powers necessary to ... [regulate relations with the In-
dian tribes] appear to the Committee to be indivisible, and 
that the parties to the confederation must have intended to 
give them entire to the Union, or to have given them entire to 
the State; these powers before the Revolution were possessed 
by the King, and exercised by him nor did they interfere with 
the legislative right of the colony within its limits; this distinc-
tion which was then and may be now taken, may perhaps 
serve to explain the proviso, part of the recited clause. The 
laws of the State can have no effect upon a tribe of Indians 
or their lands within the limits of the State 80 long as that 
tribe is independent, and not a member of that State, . .. for 
the Indian tribes are justly considered the common friends or 
enemies of the United States, and no> particular State can 
have an exclusive interest in the management of Affairs with 
any of the tribes, except in some uncommon cases. 
Id. (emphasis added). As the above quote well illustrates, the committee felt that the 
proper interpretation of Article IX of the Articles of Confederation would hold the gov-
ernance of the political relations with the tribe to be vested in the national government 
and not the states, notwithstanding the ambiguous qualifying phrase. The nationaliza-
4
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The committee concluded that, other than a cession of terri-
tory to the United States, which would itself remove the juris-
diction of the states, the only practicable solution was for the 
states to accede to exclusive congressional control of Indian af-
fairs with tribes within their boundaries. 13 
B. INCLUSION OF THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 
The problems caused by state intrusions into the area of In-
dian affairs became of paramount concern to the drafters of the 
Constitution. James Madison referred to these problems in his 
introduction to the debates in the Constitutional Convention 
when he included "treaties and war with the Indians" in his 
enumeration of the violations of federal authority under the Ar-
ticles. 14 At the convention, on August 18, 1787, fifteen days after 
the committee's report, Madison suggested that Congress be 
given the power to "[r]egulate affairs with the Indians, as well 
within as without the limits of the United States."ul Scholars 
have noted that the provisions for federal control of interstate 
and foreign commerce emerged at different times in the Conven-
tion than the Indian commerce clause.16 The language pertaining 
to Indian commerce was not combined with the interstate and 
foreign commerce provisions until September 4, 1787.17 The final 
language of the Indian commerce clause, as it appears in the 
Constitution, provides simply: "Congress shall have power . 
To regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes . "18 
C. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE- WORCESTER AND WILLIAMS 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the regulation of In-
dian commerce historically involved regulation of the political 
tion of relations with the tribes could not have been regarded as a radical change, as the 
Crown had previously exercised all powers governing relations with the tribes to the ex-
clusion of the colonial governments. 
13. Id. at 462. 
14. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (G. Hunt and J.B. Scott eds., 
1920). 
15. Id. at 420. 
16. See Able, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Con-
temporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 467-68 (1941). 
17. Id. 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3. 
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relations with tribal entities whose attributes of sovereignty in 
many ways resembled those of foreign nations. Early cases found 
the constitutional grant of power to the federal government over 
Indian "commerce" to have, consistent with the intent of the 
framers, a considerably broad scope. As Chief Justice John Mar-
shall noted, in his opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,19 the powers 
given to Congress to make war and peace, to make treaties, and 
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several 
states, and with the Indian tribes "comprehend all that is re-
quired for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians."2o 
The Court in Worcester declared as unconstitutional Geor-
gia laws which infringed on the tribal sovereignty of the Chero-
kee nation. 21 As Chief Justice Marshall stated, those laws "inter-
fere[d] with, and attempt [ed] to regulate and control the 
intercourse with the said Cherokee nation, which, by the said 
constitution, belongs exclusively to the [C]ongress of the United 
States."22 The Chief Justice also found support from the 
supremacy clause, article IV of the Constitution.23 Marshall ar-
gued that the recognition in the Constitution of treaties previ-
ously made with the Indians as the "supreme law of the land" 
was an explicit recognition of the sovereign status of the tribes.2' 
Read in the broadest possible sense, Worcester stands for 
an automatic and absolute exclusion of state law in Indian coun-
try, based on Congress's plenary control over Indian "com-
merce."211 Subsequent cases cite Worcester with approval for the 
principle that federal Indian law is supreme, though the Su-
preme Court has narrowed those instances where state action is 
barred. 
One hundred and forty-one years later, in Williams v. Lee,2s 
the Supreme Court preserved the preemptive effect of the In-
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
20. [d. at 559. 
21. [d. at 561. Worcester, a non-Indian, was indicted for violating certain laws im-
posed on those who entered the Cherokee reservation in Georgia. Worcester argued that 
these laws had no effect in Indian Country. [d. at 537-40. 
22. [d. at 540. 
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
24. 31 U.S. at 559. 
25. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, d. 3. 
26. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
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dian commerce clause as interpreted in Worcester. The test for 
preemption was restated however, as whether or not a state law 
"infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them."27 The Williams test was to apply 
only in cases where there had been no "governing Acts of Con-
gress,"28 specifically acknowledging a constitutional basis for the 
preemption of state law. The Court there noted that the princi-
ples of Worcester had been modified "over the years," but that 
these modifications would only apply to cases where "essential 
tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indi-
ans would not be jeopardized. "29 
The decisions in Worcester and Williams were based on the 
so-called Indian sovereignty doctrine, which limits state author-
ity over Indians and their land by virtue of the quasi-sovereign 
status of Indian tribes. Under this approach, state laws are gen-
erally not applicable in Indian country unless Congress, in the 
exercise of its plenary power under the Indian commerce clause, 
expressly provides that state law will apply. 
Although the Williams test appears simple on its face, the 
Court provided very little guidance to aid future courts in the 
application of the test. At least one commentator has argued 
that the Williams test, by analogy to interstate commerce clause 
cases, is merely a dormant Indian commerce clause inquiry, re-
quiring a balancing of a state's legitimate interests with the need 
for burden-free Indian commerce.30 When, as in Williams, the 
tribe's quasi-sovereign status and the federal policy of Indian 
self-determination are factored in, the dormant Indian com-
merce clause presumes the invalidity of state regulation of reser-
vation activity.31 
D. STATE TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Numerous courts have cited the Williams test when assess-
ing the validity and impact of state law within the boundaries of 
27. Id. at 220. 
28.Id. 
29. Id. at 219 (emphasis added). 
30. Laurence, The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 243 (1981). 
31. Id. at 244. 
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the reservation32 and to individual tribal members outside these 
boundaries.ss However, when a state seeks to impose its laws, 
particularly its tax laws, to persons on the reservation, the Su-
preme Court has tended to focus on federal preemption doc-
trine, basing its decisions on the supremacy clause rather than 
the Indian sovereignty doctrine or the Indian commerce clause. S4 
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,slS the 
Supreme Court found that the relevant treaties and federal stat-
utes preempted the state's authority to tax the income of a Nav-
ajo woman.36 Although the Court cited Williams with approval, 
it noted that "the trend has been away from the idea of inherent 
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and towards a 
reliance on federal pre-emption."37 According to the McClana-
han Court, the Williams test was designed to resolve conflicts 
between state and tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians by pro-
viding that a state could assert its interest only up to the point 
where tribal self-determination was affected.s8 Because McClan-
ahan, in the Court's view, presented a conflict between state and 
federal jurisdiction, the tradition of tribal sovereignty was rele-
vant only "as a backdrop against which the applicable treaties 
and federal statutes must be read."39 
It is important to note, however, that the Arizona statute in 
32. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973) 
(invalidating a state income tax as applied to reservation Indians). 
33. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (upholding 
state gross receipts tax on ski resort operated by tribe off· reservation on leased land, but 
invalidating a use tax on personal property located on-reservation). 
34. See Laurence, supra note 30, at 237-38. Laurence argues that preemption is the 
favored analysis in taxation cases because of the pervasiveness of federal statutes and 
treaties in that area. In support of this proposition, Laurence cites to footnote eight in 
the McClanahan case, see infra text accompanying notes 35-47, where the Supreme 
Court noted that "in almost all cases, federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries 
of federal and state jurisdiction." Laurence, supra note 30, at 249 (quoting McClanahan 
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.8 (1973)). Laurence also refers to McClana-
han's companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), which ex-
plains the McClanahan case as one falling within the "special area of state taxation." 
Laurence, supra note 30, at 249 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.s. at 148). 
35. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
36. [d. at 165. 
37. [d. at 172. 
38. [d. at 179. The Court also noted that it was "far from convinced" that state 
taxation of Indians, without their consent, could be reconciled with tribal self-determina-
tion. [d. 
39. 411 U.S. at 172. 
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question did not directly conflict with the federallaw,"o but was 
nonetheless invalidated by the negative implications of those 
federal laws. The Court looked to the Arizona Enabling Act,n 
which provided that "nothing [t]herein ... shall preclude the 
said State from taxing. . . any lands and other property outside 
of an Indian reservation owned or held by an Indian,"42 and 
construed the emphasized language as an express state tax im-
munity for reservation lands and income derived therefrom.43 
Similarly, in their consideration of the Buck Act,H the Court 
stated that "it should be obvious that Congress would not have 
jealously protected the immunity of reservation Indians from 
state income taxes had it thought the States had residual power 
to impose such taxes in any event. ""11 The Court's reliance on 
the negative implications of these federal enactments further 
demonstrates that the "special area of Indian taxation"46 is 
uniquely within the province of the federal government,47 and 
that the Court will show deference to congressional occupation 
of a particular legislative area. 
Three years later, in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Koo-
tenai Tribes,4s the Court followed McClanahan in invalidating a 
state cigarette tax and a personal property tax as applied to tri-
bal members."9 The Court upheld, however, the applicability of 
the same cigarette tax as applied to non-Indians who purchased 
their cigarettes from on-reservation smoke shops.IIO The Court 
found the requirement that the tribe collect the tax from non-
Indian purchasers to be a minimal burden which neither frus-
trated tribal self-governmentll1 nor ran afoul of any congres-
40. There was no federal law which expressly prohibited Arizona from taxing Indi-
ans. The Arizona law attempted to tax the income of all "resident" individuals. ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 43-102(a) (Supp. 1972-73). Plaintiff had conceded that she was a "resident" 
for purposes of the sta~ute. 411 U.S. at 166 n.3. 
41. Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. 65-219 § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 570 (1910). 
42. 411 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting the Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. 65-219 § 20, 36 
Stat. 557, 570 (1910) (emphasis added). 
43.Id. 
44. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110 (1970). 
45. 411 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added). 
46. See supra note 38. 
47. 411 U.S. at 165. 
48. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
49. [d. at 480-81. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 483 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959)). 
9
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sional enactments:12 The Court noted that "[w]ithout the simple 
expedient of having the [Indian] retailer collect the sales tax 
from non-Indian purchasers, it is clear that wholesale violations 
of the law by the latter class will go virtually unchecked."~3 
In footnote 17 of its opinion, the Moe Court purported to 
base its decision on the supremacy clause, rather than upon an 
"automatic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitutional law' either 
under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity 
doctrine. "M This footnote should not be seen as a rejection of 
commerce clause analysis as applied to state attempts to tax In-
dians, but rather, should be read as suggesting that the com-
merce clause cannot "automatically" preempt state law. Argua-
bly, footnote 17 stands for nothing more than the proposition 
that commerce clause analysis is appropriate only where 
supremacy clause analysis is not determinative.1I1I 
Such a limited reading of footnote 17 was confirmed by the 
Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville In-
dian Reservation,~8 where the United States had sought to rely 
on footnote 17 to deny Supreme Court jurisdiction over the 
state's appeal. lI? In rejecting this challenge, the Court opined 
that the government had read too much into the wording of 
footnote 17.118 The Court noted that "footnote 17 merely rejects 
the stark and rather unhelpful notion that the Commerce Clause 
provides an 'automatic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitu-
tional law" in such cases. (Emphasis added.) It does not take 
52. 425 U.S. at 483. 
53. [d. at 482. 
54. [d. at 481 n.17. 
55. Laurence, supra note 30, at 250. Laurence also proposes that the real issue be-
hind footnote 17 was whether the tribe should be entitled to a direct appeal from the 
district court to the Supreme Court. As the law stood at that time, the tribe was only 
entitled to a three-judge district court, and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, if their 
challenge to the state statute rested on some basis other than supremacy. Laurence ar-
gues that the language of footnote 17 was intended to discourage such appeals. The issue 
in now moot, however, since the instances where three-judge courts are required has 
been substantially narrowed. [d. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 1976). See also 28 
U.S.C. § 2284 (1976) (current requirements for three-judge courts). 
56. 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (decided together with Washington v. United States, No. 78-
630, and Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, No. 78-
60). 
57. 447 U.S. at 146-47. The United States appeared as a party to Washington v. 
United States, No. 78-630, which was joined with Colville for decision. 
58. 447 U.S. at 147. 
10
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that Clause entirely out of play in the field of state regulation of 
Indian affairs. "59 
In Colville, as in Moe, the Court held the tribe liable to col-
lect the state cigarette tax from its non-Indian customers.60 
However, in contrast to Moe, the tribes in Colville had enacted 
their own valid tax61 which they sought to impose on all 
smokeshop transactions in order to raise revenue for essential 
tribal government programs.62 The tribes argued that imposition 
of the state tax, and the resulting price increase, would deprive 
tribal smokeshop of business and was, therefore, an impermissi-
ble restraint on Indian commerce in violation of the commerce 
clause.63 
As in Moe, the Colville Court found that the tribes had en-
joyed a competitive advantage vis-a-vis non-reservation retailers, 
which existed only because of the tribe's claimed exemption 
from state taxation.6• The Court seemed particularly concerned 
that the tax-exempt status of the tribe under federal Indian law 
would be used as a commercial 'sword' to draw purchasers from 
the surrounding community who would buy elsewhere but for 
the claimed exemption from state tax.65 The purpose of the 
Washington statute66 requiring collection of the tax from non-
Indian purchasers was declared to be "reasonably designed to 
prevent the tribes from marketing their tax exemption to non-
[Indians] who do not receive significant tribal services and who 
would otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reserva-
tion. "67 The only burden on commerce, the Court reasoned, fell 
upon that portion of the market which existed solely because of 
the tax exemption and would not affect other portions of the 
tribes' commerce.68 
59. Id. at 148 (quoting Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 
463, 481 n.17 (1976)). 
60. 447 U.S. at 159. 
61. Id. at 151. The Court noted that no federal law to date had divested the tribe of 
its sovereign power to tax. Id. at 152-54. 
62. Id. at 154. 
63.Id. 
64. Id. at 155. 
65.Id. 
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.260 (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE Y 458-20-192 (1977). 
67. 447 U.S. at 157. 
68. Id. 
11
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In considering the claim by the tribes that the imposition of 
the state tax was inconsistent with principles of tribal self-gov-
ernment, the Court looked to the Williams test, and finally sug-
gested the proper inquiry for its application. The Colville Court 
noted that the Williams test required a balancing "between the 
interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one 
hand, and those of the state, on the other."69 
While the Tribes do have an interest in raising 
revenues for essential government programs, that 
interest is strongest when the revenues are de-
rived from value generated on the reservation by 
activities involving the Tribes and when the tax-
payer is the recipient of tribal services. The State 
also has a legitimate governmental interest in 
raising revenues, and that interest is likewise 
strongest when the tax is directed at off-reserva-
tion value and when the taxpayer is the recipient 
of state services.70 
The Court concluded that the marketing of a tax exemption did 
not constitute "value generated on the reservation,"71 especially 
where the taxpayer was receiving state services, but no tribal 
government services.72 
In specific response to the tribes' commerce clause argu-
ments, the Court echoed footnote 17 of Moe, stating that it 
could not be "seriously argued" that the Indian commerce clause 
automatically barred all state taxation of matters significantly 
touching the political and economic interests of the tribes.73 The 
tribes argued, however, that they should at least be granted a 
credit by the state for tribal taxes paid by non-Indian purchas-
ers.74 Imposition of the state tax without such a credit would 
cause an overlapping of taxes, resulting in a higher price on-res-
ervation as compared to off-reservation, thus placing the tribes 
not on an equal footing, but at a competitive disadvantage.71i 
69. ld. at 156. 
70. ld. at 156·57. 
71. ld. at 155. 
72. ld. at 157. 
73. ld. (citing Moe v. Confederated Tribes of the Salish and Kootenai, 425 U.S. 463, 
481 n.17 (1976)). 
74. 447 U.S. at 157. 
75.ld. 
12
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While acknowledging that "this argument is not without 
force,"76 the Court found that the tribes had "failed to demon-
strate that business at the smokeshops would be significantly re-
duced by a state tax without a credit as compared to a state tax 
with a credit."77 Nonetheless, statements following this language 
in the Court's opinion strongly indicate that failure to give such 
a credit would be an impermissible burden on Indian commerce 
if it would deter sales which would occur on the reservation due 
to its location and the efforts of the tribe in importing and mar-
keting the cigarettes.78 
E. THE DUAL BARRIER MODEL 
Recent cases have not relied solely upon strict supremacy 
clause analysis, marking an apparent end to the trend noted by 
the McClanahan Court. Instead, there has been a return to a 
Williams-type analysis, which became more workable after the 
Colville Court's elucidation of what constitutes "interference 
with tribal self-government."79 The Court has now recognized, 
based on the Indian commerce clause and the Williams princi-
ples, two "independent but related" barriers to the exercise of 
state authority over commercial activity on an Indian reserva-
tion: state authority may be preempted by federal law or it may 
interfere with the tribe's ability to exercise its sovereign 
functions.80 
The two barriers are independent because 
76. [d. 
77. [d. 
either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis 
for holding state law inapplicable to activity un-
dertaken on the reservation or by tribal mem-
bers. They are related, however, in two important 
ways. The right of tribal self-government is ulti-
mately dependent on and subject to the broad 
power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions of 
Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in 
our jurisprudence that they have provided an im-
portant 'backdrop,' . . . against which vague or 
78. [d. at 158. 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
80. See infra note 81. 
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ambiguous federal enactments must always be 
measured.81 
Applying the foregoing standards, the Court, in White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,82 held that federal regula-
tion of Indian logging enterprises preempted a state motor car-
rier license and use fuel tax as applied to a non-Indian logging 
company operating on tribal land. 83 The Court observed that the 
pervasive federal regulation of timber harvesting precluded im-
position of additional burdens on the tribe's commerce,8' despite 
the fact that the legal incidence of the tax fell upon non-
Indians.8Ci 
In Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of 
New Mexico,86 the Court similarly invalidated a gross receipts 
tax as applied to a non-Indian construction company which con-
structed a school on the reservation.87 The Court found that fed-
eral Indian policy, 88 and the regulations governing the construc-
tion of Indian schools, left no room for the additional burden 
sought to be imposed by New Mexico.89 The Court observed that 
the state did not seek to assess the tax in return for providing 
governmental services, since it had specifically withdrawn those 
services by declining to take any responsibility for the education 
of Indian children,90 and that the services provided to the non-
Indian contractor were "not a legitimate justification for a tax 
whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal organization."9} 
81. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (citing Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973» (emphasis added). 
82. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
83. [d. at 148. 
84. [d. 
85. The tax was not levied upon the tribe, but on the non-Indian contractor. 448 
U.S. at 137-38. It was nevertheless undisputed that the effect of the tax on tribal revenue 
from timber sales would result in the "burden" of the tax being borne by the tribe. [d. at 
151. 
86. 458 U.S. 832 (1982). 
87. [d. at 834. 
88. The Court cited numerous federal enactments, including the Indian Financing 
Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982) and the Indian Self-Determination and Edu-
cation Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450(n) (1982). The Court particularly relied upon 
25 U.S.C. § 450a(c) as a statement of the federal policy of promoting the quality of In-
dian education. 458 U.S. at 840. 
89. 458 U.S. at 841-42. 
90. [d. at 843. 
91. [d. at 844. 
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The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of 
the United States, urged the Court in Ramah to modify their 
preemption analysis and rely upon the Indian commerce clause 
to hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident tribe 
are presumptively beyond the reach of state law.s2 Rather than 
reject this approach, the Court merely found it unnecessary to 
adopt it, observing that the current preemption analysis was 
"sufficiently sensitive" to protect tribal interests.S3 Hence, the 
Court relied on preemption analysis in New Mexico v. Mescalero 
Apache Tribes. when it found that 
[t]he exercise of concurrent [regulatory] jurisdic-
tion by the State would effectively nullify the 
Tribe's unquestioned authority to regulate the 
use of its resources by members and non-mem-
bers, interfere with the comprehensive tribal reg-
ulatory scheme, and threaten Congress' firm com-
mittment to the encouragement of tribal self-
sufficiency and economic development.95 
At issue in Mescalero Apache Tribe was the imposition of 
New Mexico's fish and game laws to non-Indians on reservation 
lands. As a prelude to its preemption analysis, the unanimous 
Court undertook to summarize the law, up to that point, of fed-
eral preemption as it related to state jurisdiction over Indians. 
The Court stated the following general principles: 
1) While under some circumstances a State 
may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over non-In-
dians acting on tribal reservations,96 "such au-
thority may be asserted only if not preempted by 
the operation of federallaw."s7 
2) Although a State will certainly be without 
92. [d. at 845. 
93. [d. at 846. 
94. 462 U.S. 324 (1983). 
95. [d. at 343-44. 
96. [d. at 333 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Res-
ervation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 
U.S. 463 (1976». 
97. 462 U.S. at 333 (citing Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 
U.S. 832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980); 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959». 
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jurisdiction if its authority is pre-empted under 
familiar principles of pre-emption, we cautioned 
that our prior cases did not limit pre-emption of 
state laws affecting Indian tribes to only those 
circumstances.98 
3) State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the op-
eration of federal law if it interferes or is incom-
patible with federal and tribal interests reflected 
in federal law, unless the state interests at stake 
are sufficient to justify the assertion of state 
authority.99 
4) The exercise of state authority may also be 
barred by an independent barrier-inherent tri-
bal sovereignty-if it 'unlawfully infringe[s] 'on 
the right of reservation Indians to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them.'lOO 
5) Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enter-
prise under the authority of federal law, an asser-
tion of state authority must be viewed against any 
interference with the successful accomplishment 
of the federal purpose.101 
Applying the foregoing principles, the Court found that the 
federal law which commit to the tribe and the Secretary of the 
Interior the responsibility for managing the resources of the res-
ervation, as well as the policies embodied in the Indian Financ-
ing Act of 1974,1°2 the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1974,1°3 and the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934,104 preempted the application of state fish and game law to 
non-Indians hunting and fishing on the reservation. The Court 
found no overriding justification for the tax since the state did 
98. 462 U.S. at 333·34 (emphasis added). 
99. Id. at 334 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 
(1980». 
100. 462 U.S. at 334 n.16 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 
136, 142 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959». 
101. 462 U.S. at 336 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 
143 (1980); Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982)). 
102. 462 U.S. at 335 n.17. See supra note 88. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461·492 (1982 & Supp. II) (current form of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934). 
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not contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of 
tribal resources nor could the state demonstrate any governmen-
tal function it provided in connection with the particular activ-
ity of non-members the state sought to regulate. 1011 The loss of 
revenue to the state from fish and game licensing fees was found 
to be an insufficient justification for concurrent jurisdiction. IDS 
As to interference with congressional purpose, the unani-
mous Court declared: 
The assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by 
New Mexico ... would also threaten Congress' 
overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-gov-
ernment and economic development. The Tribe 
has engaged in a concerted and sustained under-
taking to develop and manage the reservation's 
wildlife and land resources specifically for the 
benefit of its members. The project generates 
funds for essential tribal services and provides 
employment for members who reside on the reser-
vation. This case is thus far removed from those 
situations. . . in which the tribal contribution to 
an enterprise is de minimus. [citation omitted]. 
The tribal enterprise in this case clearly involves 
"value generated on the reservation by activities 
involving the Trib[e]" [citation omitted]. The dis-
ruptive effect that would result from the assertion 
of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico, would 
plainly" 'stan[d] as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.' "107 
III. OPPORTUNITY MISSED-THE CHEMEHUEVI CASE 
One recent case, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California 
State Board of Equalization,108 presented an opportunity for 
105. 462 u.s. at 341-42. 
106. [d. at 342-43. 
107. [d. at 341 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
108. No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham 
presiding, reu'd 757 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985). In 
an earlier published opinion, the same district court dismissed California's counterclaim 
against the Tribe on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immu-
17
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the federal courts to explore those applications of the Indian 
commerce clause expressly reserved by the Supreme Court in 
the cases discussed in the previous section. The district court, 
however, misconstrued the applicable law. On appeal neither the 
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court reached the commerce 
clause issues. 
A. FACTS 
The Chemehuevi Indian Tribe (Tribe) is a federally recog-
nized Indian tribe, organized under Section 16 of the Indian Re-
organization Act of 1934109 and governed by a tribal council. In 
1976, pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act,l1O the Tribe 
adopted a constitution, which, as subsequently amended, was 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior on April 21, 1977. 
Under that constitution, the Tribe is vested, inter alia, with the 
power to levy taxes and fees. III 
The Tribe is the beneficial owner of 32,000 acres of land ad-
jacent to Lake Havasu in southeastern California. ll2 In June of 
1976, the Tribe sought and obtained from the Department of the 
Interior Revolving Loan Fund a loan in the amount of 
$1,200,000 for the purpose of purchasing the assets and facilities 
of Havasu Landing, Inc., a functioning resort complex located on 
the lakeshore and completely within the reservation. ll3 Shortly 
thereafter, the Tribe purchased the Landing and began operat-
ing the business. At present, the Tribe conducts the following 
businesses at or near the resort: a grocery store, including a tri-
bal retail tobacco outlet; a bar; a restaurant; a marina; a boat-
house which includes a gas station, a tackle shop, and a tribal 
retail tobacco outlet; a campground; a motel; a wildlife program 
which includes the sale of fishing licenses; and a joint partner-
ship for the retail sale of mobile homes.11• 
nity. 492 F. Supp. 55, 61 (N.D. Cal. 1980), alf'd 757 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985). 
109. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). 
110. [d. 
111. Stipulation of Facts at 2, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of 
Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), rev'd 757 F.2d 1047 (9th 
Cir. 1985), alf'd per curiam 106 S.Ct. 289 (1985). 
112. Legal title to the land is held in trust by the United States for the benefit of 
the Tribe. [d. 
113. [d. at 3. 
114. [d. at 4-5. 
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Subsequently, in May of 1978, the Tribe sought and ob-
tained a further loan for the purpose of constructing a mobile 
home park within the reservation. ll5 These loans are secured by 
an assignment to the United States of all the assets of both 
Havasu Landing and the mobile home park and all the income 
derived therefrom now and in the future.1I6 
The Tribe enacted a Business and Cigarette Tax Code 
which regulates the sale of cigarettes, imposes a tribal cigarette 
tax and provides for the licensing of businesses within the exte-
rior boundaries of the reservation. ll7 Prior to this time, the 
Tribe had collected, and remitted to the Board of Equalization 
(Board) the California tax imposed on the distribution of ciga-
rettes. ll8 On December 17, 1977, the Tribe enacted a detailed 
Tribal Retail Tobacco Outlets Ordinance which set forth the 
procedures for the operation of a cigarette outlet owned and op-
erated by the Tribe and levied a tribal excise tax upon the 
purchase or possession by consumers of cigarettes and other to-
bacco products.1I9 On October 15, 1980, the Tribe enacted a new 
Use and Cigarette Tax Ordinance in order to fully tax the on-
reservation sales of cigarettes. The ordinance went into effect on 
.January 1, 1981.120 The Tribe at present imposes a tribal tax at 
a rate equivalent to the state cigarette tax. 
When the Tribe ceased remitting the state tax to the Board, 
the Board took legal action against the Tribe including serving a 
"withhold notice" on the Tribe's bank121 and placing liens on the 
Tribe's tangible assets.122 The Tribe filed an action in the dis-
trict court to enjoin the Board from enforcing its cigarette tax 
lawl23 against the Tribe, and the Board counterclaimed for the 
amount of taxes allegedly due. The district court dismissed the 
115. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 5, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California 
State Bd. of Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 
1047 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985). 
116. Stipulation of Facts at 4; Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 5-6. These as-
signments were given pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 101.13, which requires that security be 
posted for Indian loans. 
117. Stipulation of Facts at 5. 
118. [d. at 6. 
119. [d. at 5. 
120. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 2. 
121. Stipulation of Facts at 12-13. 
122. [d. at 13. 
123. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 30001-30479 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). 
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counterclaim on the ground that the Tribe, as a sovereign, was 
immune from unconsented suit.124 The trial on the issue of the 
applicability of the state tax was subsequently held, based upon 
a stipulated record. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION 
The Tribe challenged the tax on several grounds, three of 
which are relevant to this discussion: preemption by federal law, 
interference with tribal self-government, and as an undue bur-
den which discriminated against Indian commerce in violation of 
the "negative implications" of the Indian commerce clause. I211 
Although the district court cited the appropriate case law, it 
failed, or simply refused, to apply the facts in the stipulated rec-
ord to the tests set forth in the Supreme Court cases. I2S 
1. Preemption 
The Tribe had argued that several factors preempted the 
operation of state taxing jurisdiction over non·Indians on the 
Reservation. In particular, the Tribe argued that the Indian Fi-
nancing Act of 1974,127 the Buck Act,128 and the policies under-
lying these and other acts of Congress affecting Indians,129 pre-
empted the state from imposing its tax. ISO In response, the 
district court undertook a discussion of preemption analysis 
which included a discussion of the facts and holdings of both 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. BrackerI81 and Ramah Nav· 
ajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue. 182 From its reading of 
those cases, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court 
"has found federal preemption in areas which have been specifi· 
cally regulated in a detailed fashion by Congress, or which affect 
124. 492 F. Supp. 55, 61 (N.D. Cal. 1980), reu'd on other grounds 757 F.2d 1047 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
125. Memorandum and Order at 1-2, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State 
Bd. of Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), reu'd 757 F.2d 1047 
(9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985). 
126. [d. at 16-44. 
127. [d. at 22. 
128. [d. at 26. 
129. [d. at 1. 
130. [d. 
131. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
132. 458 U.S. 836 (1982). 
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adversely such a particularized federal plan. However, the Court 
has not suggested that such federal preemption exists in the 
area involved in the case at bar."133 
Instead, the district court looked to Moe v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Salish and Kootenai l34 and Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,m, because 
these cases involved cigarette taxes. In its discussion of Colville, 
the district court quoted the Supreme Court's language in that 
case, which stated that the policies underlying congressional In-
dian legislation (relied upon by both the tribes in Colville and 
the Chemehuevi Tribe) did not go "so far as to grant to tribal 
enterprises selling goods an artificial competitive advantage over 
all other businesses in a State. "136 Immediately following this 
quote, the district court concluded that, on the basis of Moe and 
Colville, congressional legislation did not preempt the California 
law. 137 
In this part of its opinion, the district court did not refer to 
the Supreme Court's unambiguous opinion in New Mexico v. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, which stated that the circumstances of 
prior cases did not limit preemption to those situations alone.13s 
There was no reason, therefore, to retreat from preemption anal-
ysis merely because the Supreme Court had not yet used it in a' 
cigarette taxation case. In point of fact, the Supreme Court re-
lied upon these same acts of Congress when they invalidated the 
application of New Mexico's fish and game laws on the Mes-
calero reservation.139 In Mescalero Apache Tribe, Congress's 
overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and 
economic development prevailed. 
Even without the guidance of the Mescalero Apache Tribe 
opinion, the district court seemed to ignore its own findings of 
fact. The district court found that the price of a carton of ciga-
rettes on the Reservation was approximately thirty cents lower 
133. Memorandum and Order at 20. 
134. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
135. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
136. Memorandum and Order at 21 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980». 
137. Memorandum and Order at 21. 
138. 462 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1983). 
139. [d. at 334-35. 
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than off-reservation, and that such a difference did not itself 
draw purchasers onto the reservation. 140 Had the district court 
applied the language of Colville, which it quoted, it would have 
concluded that an exemption from state taxation in this case did 
not create "an artificial competitive advantage over all other 
businesses in the state."14l The result in Colville should only ap-
ply where cigarette purchasers are drawn onto the reservation 
for no other reason that a claimed exemption from state tax. In 
the absence of a tax-exempt market, the goals of fostering tribal 
self-government and economic development recognized in Col-
ville should take precedence over and, as in Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, should preempt state authority. 
2. Interference with Tribal Self-Government 
The Tribe argued that the imposition of the state tax would 
impermissibly infringe upon the Tribe's right of self-govern-
ment, as set forth in Williams. Imposition of a state tax, in addi-
tion to the lawful tax imposed by the Tribe itself, would result 
in a rise in the price of cigarettes on the reservation equal to the 
amount of the state tax.142 In order to lower the price, and 
thereby overcome this competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other 
retailers in the state, the Tribe would be forced to chose either 
to reduce its profit or to reduce its tax. In the case of the former, 
the Tribe's ability to finance the operation of its primary busi-
ness enterprise would be impaired. In the latter case, its ability 
to provide essential governmental services on the reservation 
would be impaired. The district court examined the Williams 
test, and the cases which had applied it, concluding that such an 
"infringement" test was applicable only where preemption was 
clearly not present. The district court took particular notice of 
the Colville formula which balances the interests of the tribe 
and federal government on the one hand and the interests of the 
state on the other. As discussed above, Colville states that the 
tribe's interest is strongest when 1) the value being taxed is gen-
erated on-reservation by tribal effort and 2) the taxpayer is the 
recipient of tribal governmental services. The state interest is 
140. Memorandum and Order at 36. 
141. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134. 155 (1980). 
142. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 4. 
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strongest when the tax's value is off-reservation and the tax-
payer is the recipient of state services. 143 
The district court in Chemehuevi examined the state's in-
terest first, finding that the state tax could not be said to be 
directed at off-reservation value.144 Turning to the services pro-
vided by the state, the district court noted that the state main-
tained two miles of reservation road and provided transportation 
for reservation children to attend school in Needles, Califor-
nia.145 The school in Needles, as well as the grammar school on 
the reservation,146 are supported by federal, state and local mon-
ies. The state also provides law enforcement assistance. 147 
The Tribe, on the other hand, provides water, sanitation, 
law enforcement, road maintenance, fish and wildlife manage-
ment, housing improvement programs, housing for tribal mem-
bers, community welfare and recreation, and postal services.148 
"Thus," concluded the district court, "the Tribe, as well as the 
State, funds services to those who live on, and visit, the reserva-
tion. "149 Even if the state and the Tribe provided an equal 
amount of governmental services, then the fact that the value 
sought to be taxed in the cigarette sales is on-reservation,1II0 
should tip the balance of interests in favor of the Tribe. How-
ever, the district court's enumeration of services provided by 
each governmental entity indicates that the level of services is 
not equal, and that the Tribe is providing the lion's share of 
local governmental services. Therefore, under the Williams test, 
as modified by Colville, the state tax does infringe upon tribal 
self-government. 
The district court does not appear to have used the Colville 
application of the Williams test. It appears to have relied in-
stead on pre-Colville decisions which applied a more restrictive 
version of the Williams test. It also appears to have miscon-
strued the application of the Colville modification in the one 
143. 447 U.S. at 157. 
144. Memorandum and Order at 35. 




149. [d. at 38. 
150. Id. at 35. 
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post-Colville Ninth Circuit decision that it discusses. 
The first pre-Colville case relied upon by the district court 
was Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernadino County/lSI in which 
the court upheld the imposition of California's possessory inter-
est tax to a non-Indian lessee on the reservation.lIS2 In that case, 
the Ninth Circuit decided that the infringement was not serious 
enough to invalidate the tax, although it did not examine the 
interests of the tribe as required by Colville and subsequent 
cases. Because this case did not consider the balancing man-
dated by Colville, it provided no useful guidance to the district 
court in applying that test to the facts in Chemehuevi. 
The district court then looked to White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Arizona/1I3 wherein the Ninth Circuit had held that the 
imposition of concurrent state jurisdiction over the regulation of 
hunting and fishing on the reservation was not violative of the 
right to tribal self-government. That case cited Colville for the 
proposition that a reduction in tribal revenue caused by concur-
rent taxing jurisdiction does not violate the right to self-govern-
ment. I114 Colville stands for no such thing; rather, it points out 
that loss of revenue alone is not sufficient to establish infringe-
ment and that the court must perform a balancing test to deter-
mine whether the state's exercise of concurrent jurisdiction does 
infringe upon the tribe's right to self-government. 1 1111 The Col-
ville Court merely held that the right to tribal self-government 
does not include the right to market a tax exemption to the det-
riment of off-reservation businesses. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court dealt with the issue of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction 
in Mescalero Apache Tribe and found, in derogation of the 
Ninth Circuit, that it did infringe on tribal self-government. The 
district court in Chemehuevi took note of this fact in a 
footnote. 1116 
The only Ninth Circuit case cited by the district court 
which actually applied the Colville balancing test was Crow 
151. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 983 (1977). 
152. [d. at 1258. 
153. 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981). 
154. [d. at 1284. 
155. 447 U.S. at 156-57. 
156. Memorandum and Order at 46 n.2. 
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Tribe of Indians v. Montana.lr>7 In Crow Tribe, the Ninth Cir-
cuit opined that the fact that state and tribal taxes were im-
posed on the same activity did not, by itself, preclude the state 
from imposing its tax. IllS The court noted, however, that in prac-
tice, concurrent jurisdiction forced the tribe to choose between 
damaging its commercial venture or foregoing tax revenues alto-
gether. 11l9 After applying the analysis dictated by Colville, the 
Crow Tribe court concluded: 
In this case, the revenues sought to be taxed 
by Montana may ultimately be traced to the 
Tribe's mineral resources, a component of the 
reservation land itself. This is not a case where 
the tribe is simply marketing a tax exemption, as 
where the tribes seek to sell tax-free cigarettes to 
non-Indians. Any substantial incursion into the 
revenues obtained from the sale of the Indian's 
land-based wealth cuts to the heart of the 
Tribe's ability to sustain itself.180 
The statements of the Crow Tribe court clearly follow the 
Colville opinion by distinguishing between the marketing of a 
tax exemption and value generated by the geographical attrib-
utes of the reservation. Recognizing this distinction, the Ninth 
Circuit found the state tax to be impermissible. lSI 
Although the district court in Chemehuevi purported to fol-
low Ninth Circuit authority in finding the California tax permis-
sible, in fact it fashioned its own unique test to determine 
whether the California tax infringed the Chemehuevi Tribe's 
right of self-government. The district court's test sought to de-
termine whether "the anticipated reduction of profits/tax reve-
nues from the sales of cigarettes would render the Tribe so des-
titute as to emasculate its ability to conduct its tribal 
government. "lS2 
157. 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), as amended 665 F.2d 1390 (1982), cert. denied, 
102 S. Ct. 635 (1981). 
158. [d. at 1115. 
I 159. [d. at 1116. 
160. [d. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
161. [d. 
162. Memorandum and Order at 40. 
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The district court framed the test as whether or not the im-
position of state taxing jurisdiction would seriously jeopardize 
the Tribe's ability to conduct its tribal government. 163 The dis-
trict court erred in fashioning such a stringent standard. After 
Colville and Moe, the Chemehuevi Tribe only had to prove that 
imposition of a double tax would cause some reduction in tribal 
revenues which are used to provide essential governmental ser-
vices. 164 The question is not, as the district court asked, how 
much infringement is permissible, but whether there has been 
any infringement. Regardless of the standards employed by the 
Ninth Circuit before Colville, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that, in light of the tradition of tribal sovereignty, states "may 
not act" in a manner that infringes on the right of reservation 
Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled by them. "165 Even 
if one substitutes the language of the Ninth Circuit in Crow 
Tribe, the result should be the same. So long as the tribe does 
not merely market an exemption from state taxation, but mar-
kets a value created by either its land-based resources, including 
the location or other geographical attributes of the land, or the 
efforts of the tribe by the importation and marketing of goods, a 
state tax which infringes upon the tribal right of self-govern-
ment is impermissible. 
3. Discrimination against Indian Commerce 
The Tribe also asserted that imposition of the state tax 
would place a multiple tax burden upon transactions occurring 
on the reservation and that such a burden operates to reduce the 
number of cigarette transactions on the reservation. The Tribe 
argued that the state's failure to give credit for taxes paid to 
reservation purchasers, while affording such a credit to purchas-
ers from other states, explicitly discriminates against Indian 
commerce and violates the negative implications of the Indian 
commerce clause. 
The district court refused to examine the validity of the 
Tribe's commerce clause arguments, observing that the Supreme 
163. [d. 
164. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 158 (1980). 
165. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
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Court had never relied upon dormant commerce clause analysis 
in any case involving Indian commerce.166 The court did discuss, 
however, whether the state should afford a credit to purchasers 
for tribal taxes paid, since any actual reduction in sales would 
also be pertinent to the infringement analysis discussed above. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Colville was 
faced with a similar argument. However, in that case, the Court 
found that a burden fell only upon that portion of tribal com-
merce which existed solely because of a claimed exemption from 
state tax. 167 Referring to Colville, the district court noted: 
Colville did not resolve the crucial issue of 
double taxation, although it did hold that the 
state need not afford the purchaser a tax credit 
for tribal taxes when the tribe is marketing only a 
tax exemption. The Court stated that the argu-
ment that the tribe would be placed at an imper-
missible competitive disadvantage by the overlap 
of state and tribal taxation "is not without force," 
(citation omitted), but found that the tribe had 
failed to demonstrate in that case that their busi-
ness would have been reduced by a state tax with-
out a credit as opposed to a state tax with a 
credit. 168 
The district court then quoted Colville directly: 
[W]e cannot infer on the present record that by 
failing to give a credit Washington impermissibly 
taxes reservation value by deterring sales that, if 
credit were given, would occur on the reservation 
because of its location and because of the efforts 
of the tribes in importing and marketing the 
cigarettes. lee 
Applying the facts of the Chemehuevi case to the language 
of the foregoing quote would seem to mandate such a credit. The 
district court found not only that the Tribe was marketing much 
166. Memorandum and Order at 41. 
167. Colville, 447 U.S. at 157. 
168. Memorandum and Order at 29-30 (emphasis in original). 
169. [d. at 30 (emphasis added). 
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more than a tax exemption,l7O but acknowledged empirical evi-
dence presented by the Tribe that thirty-eight percent of non-
resident cigarette purchasers would buy fewer cigarettes if the 
price were increased by the amount of the state tax. l7l Unlike 
Colville, where tribe members sold cigarettes from trailers 
parked on reservation lands, the Chemehuevi operate a substan-
tial commercial enterprise which draws visitors onto the reserva-
tion for reasons other than to buy cigarettes. 172 It is reasonable 
to infer that if, as the district court found, the price of a carton 
of cigarettes on-reservation is within thirty cents of the price off-
reservation, then customers on the reservation would be com-
pletely unaware of a state tax exemption. Applying the Colville 
language, if sales due to the "location" of the reservation, and to 
the Tribe's "efforts ... in importing and marketing the ciga-
rettes," are deterred, then failure to grant a credit becomes 
"impermissible."173 
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the Tribe 
was not entitled to a credit. The court noted that California 
granted such a credit pursuant to a Multi-State Tax Compact. l74 
Under the Compact, California gave full credit to purchasers 
who paid sales and use taxes to other member-states.176 The 
Tribe was clearly not a member of the Compact, and could not 
be because the Compact was between states and Indian tribes 
"are not of equal status to state governments."176 Therefore, the 
Tribe was not entitled to a credit. 
170. [d. at 35. 
171. [d. at 39. See infra note 211. 
172. The nearest cigarette retailer in California is in Needles, 40 miles away. Thus, 
there is no significant competition between the Tribe and California retailers. The Tribe 
does compete directly with retailers in Havasu City, Arizona, four miles across the lake, 
whose cigarettes bear only a four percent sales tax (California's Sales Tax is six percent). 
The Chemehuevi Tribe's biggest competition, however, is the Colorado River Indian 
Tribe, located in Arizona. Since the incidence of the Arizona Sales Tax falls upon the 
tribe, and the tribe is exempt from paying the tax under The Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-
110 (1982), the Colorado River Indians can sell their cigarettes totally free from state 
tax. See Declaration of Pamela Williams in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, No. C-77-
2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983). 
173. Colville, 447 U.S. at 158. 
174. [d. at 42 (referring to CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 38001-38021 (West 1979 & 
Supp. 1986». See also Memorandum and Order at 47 n.6 (district court's interpretation 
of the Compact). 
175. Memorandum and Order at 42. 
176. [d. at 43. 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/13
1986] INDIAN LAW 233 
The Tribe had also argued that, if it were forced to partici-
pate in California's statutory tax scheme, then it was also enti-
tled to participate in the revenue sharing plan that went with 
it.I77 Under this scheme, a portion of the state cigarette tax reve-
nues are returned to local city and county governments. I78 The 
obvious purpose of this provision is to provide revenue to local 
governments as a disincentive to enact their own local cigarette 
tax. California has never made disbursements to the tribe pursu-
ant to these provisions, despite the fact that the tribe provides 
local governmental services.179 Permitting California to impose 
its full tax without an identical rebate, the Tribe argued, dis-
criminates against the tribe as a provider of local services_ and 
would violate the Indian commerce clause. The district court re-
sponded that it "perceive[d] no argument which would persuade 
us that the Tribe, merely because it does provide some seryices 
to visitors from across the state,should equitably share in the 
fund. Indian tribes are simply not the equivalent of state or local 
governments."180 The court held that failure to include the Tribe 
in the revenue sharing plan did not discriminate against Indian 
commerce in violation of the Indian commerce clause.I81 
The district court did not address a third argument made 
by the Tribe that the California tax was discriminatory. Under 
the California statutory scheme, a tax is levied on the purchaser 
of "untaxed cigarettes" for their use and consumption within the 
state. I82 However, the administrative regulations which interpret 
this statute provide for a blanket exemption from the cigarette 
tax for anyone who brings no more than four hundred cigarettes 
(two cartons) into the state.183 The state does not exempt from 
tax cigarettes purchased on the reservation, thereby making 
sales by in-state Indian tribes the only transactions in which 
purchasers who buy and transport their own cigarettes would be 
required to pay the tax on purchases of less than two cartons of 
cigarettes. On appeal from the district court, the Ninth Circuit 
commented that it was unclear whether "such a tax could sur-
177. Id. at 41. 
17S. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30462 (West 1979). 
179. Memorandum and Order at S. 
ISO. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
181. [d. 
1S2. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 30005, 30008, 30009, 30107 (West 1979). 
183. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 4091 (1972); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30106 (West 1979). 
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vive constitutional scrutiny,"184 although the court found it un-
necessary to resolve the issue.185 
The most curious aspect of the district court's holding, that 
the California taxing scheme did not violate the Indian com-
merce clause, is the total and complete absence of a constitu-
tional analysis to support it. The district court in Chemehuevi 
was not incorrect when it noted that the Supreme Court had 
never "relied upon" commerce clause analysis in an Indian com-
merce case.186 However, the validity of such an analysis has 
never been foreclosed. Rather, the Court has merely found it 
more convenient to apply preemption analysis. Certain fact situ-
ations, such as that in Chemehuevi, are difficult to analyze 
under principles of preemption and may be more readily ex-
amined using the commerce clause. 
IV. SUGGESTED MODEL OF COMMERCE CLAUSE 
ANALYSIS 
As the basis for Congress's plenary control over interstate, 
foreign and Indian commerce, the commerce clause has played a 
unique and prominent role in constitutional law. The history of 
the inclusion of this clause in our Constitution demonstrates 
that it was intended to keep the states from acting indepen-
dently to discriminate against certain types of trade or to other-
wise inhibit commerce.187 In modern times, the Supreme Court 
has allowed the states to protect their legitimate interests so 
long as they do not interfere with, or otherwise burden, inter-
state and foreign commerce. 
A. COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
Chief Justice Marshall took the intent of the framers into 
account in his landmark opinion in Worcester v. Georgia/88 
when he stated that Indian affairs were within the exclusive con-
184. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 757 F.2d 
1047, 1057 n.13 (9th Cir. 1985). 
185. [d. 
186. Memorandum and Order at 41. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 5-13. 
188. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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trol of the federal government.18S In modern times, under much 
different circumstances, the Supreme Court has qualified this 
holding. Yet the Court has not overruled Worcester and has con-
tinued to protect the principles for which it stands. Rather, the 
Court has said that the commerce clause may be invoked to pre-
vent undue discrimination against Indian commerce/so espe-
cially where preemption analysis does not suggest a clear result. 
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest a situation 
where commerce clause analysis would be appropriate. In Mer-
rion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,l9l an Indian tribal tax on gas and 
oil production was challenged by non-Indians lessees as violative 
of the commerce clause. The Supreme Court found that the tax 
did not discriminate against interstate commerce since the tax 
was fairly apportioned, that is, the tax was fairly related to- the 
amount of the activity occurring on the reservation and to the 
services provided by the tribe. ls2 The Court went on to state 
however, that a state tax applied to on-reservation activity could 
be invalid under the commerce clause. 
[W]hen the activity taxed by the Tribe occurs en-
tirely on tribal lands, the multiple taxation issue 
would arise only if a State attempted to levy a tax 
on the same activity, which is more than the 
State's contact with the activity would justify. In 
such a circumstance, any challenge asserting that 
tribal and state taxes create a multiple burden on 
interstate commerce should be directed at the 
state tax which, in the absence of congressional 
ratification, might be invalidated under the Com-
merce Clause. ls3 
This quote illustrates rather clearly the continued validity of 
commerce clause analysis in the area of Indian affairs. Neverthe-
less, it must be emphasized that there are significant differences 
between interstate and Indian commerce. 
189. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
190. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 157 (1980). 
191. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
192. Id. at 156-58 and nn.23, 26. 
193. Id. at 158 n.26 (emphasis in original). 
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B. SPECIAL FEATURES OF INDIAN COMMERCE 
Although, in certain instances, analogies between interstate 
and Indian commerce may be appropriate, there are unique and 
vital considerations that come into play when Indian commerce 
is in issue. Indian commerce, unlike interstate commerce, must 
be viewed within the context of the special trust relationship 
which exists between Indian tribes and the federal government. 
It also must be considered within the context of the express con-
gressional policy of encouraging Indian self-government and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency/9' for without a free and uninhibited flow 
of commerce between Indian tribes and non-Indians, these goals 
cannot be achieved. 
The interest of the federal government in regulating inter-
state commerce is primarily economic in nature. The purpose of 
federal control over interstate commerce is to prevent anyone 
state from inhibiting the flow flow of trade between the states,191) 
but the government does not seek to control the political rela-
tions amongst the states with the interstate commerce clause. 
Regulation of Indian commerce, on the other hand, has histori-
cally involved regulation of the political relationships with enti-
ties who possess attributes of sovereignty and hence, in certain 
ways, resemble foreign nations.1ge This distinction was clearly 
recognized by the framers when they included Indian tribes in 
the commerce clause.197 Non-uniform state regulation and taxa-
tion in the area of Indian commerce would tend to disrupt fed-
eral Indian policy, no less than in the area of foreign commerce. 
The existence of comprehensive federal policies concerning the 
political relations with foreign nations and with Indian tribes 
suggests that it would be more useful to examine Supreme Court 
authority in the area of foreign commerce for an appropriate an-
alytic model. 
A suitable model of foreign commerce clause analysis ap-
194. See, e.g., The Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982 & Supp. 
11). See also Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 839-40 
(1982) (discussion of federal policies encouraging the development of tribal education). 
195. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979). 
196. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 3, sec. B., ch. 4, sec. Al 
(1982). 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14. 
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pears in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles/9s wherein 
the Supreme Court was faced with the applicability of Califor-
nia's ad valorem property taxes to cargo containers located 
within the state which were owned by a Japanese company and 
used in foreign commerce.199 The state had argued that the ser-
vices it provided while the containers were within the state, such 
as fire and police protection, justified the imposition of the 
tax.200 The Court found that, had it been an interstate com-
merce situation, the state tax would have been valid. However, 
because of the special nature of foreign commerce, the Court 
noted that a more extensive constitutional inquiry was re-
quired.201 The Court applied a six-step test to determine 
whether a state tax placed an impermissible burden on com-
merce. If the activity sought to be taxed 1) lacks a substantial 
nexus with the taxing state; 2) is not fairly apportioned; 3) dis-
criminates against [foreign] commerce; 4) is not fairly related to 
the services provided by the state;202 5) creates a substantial risk 
of multiple taxation, apportionment notwithstanding; and 6) 
prevents the federal government from speaking with one voice in 
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, then 
such a tax is impermissible under the Constitution.203 
The first four elements, which form the test for whether a 
state tax impermissibly burdens interstate commerce,204 were 
met by the state. The Court held, however, that failure to meet 
either of the additional tests rendered the tax repugnant to the 
commerce clause and therefore invalid.20G Such additional tests 
were mandated by the need to prevent "a double tax burden to 
which [domestic] commerce is not exposed, and which the com-
merce clause forbids"206 and to maintain uniformity in an area 
of national concern.207 
A similar set of concerns exists in the area-of Indian com-
198. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
199. [d. at 444. 
200. [d. at 445. 
201. [d. at 446. 
202. [d. at 444-45 (citing Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
203. 441 U.S. at 451. 
204. See Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
205. 441 U.S. at 451. 
206. [d. at 448. 
207. [d. at 448-49. 
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merce. The Constitution vests the federal government with the 
power to regulate intercourse with the Indian tribes,208 and it 
has done so in a comprehensive manner. The oft-cited policies of 
encouraging tribal self-government and economic self-sufficiency 
are firmly imbedded in congressional legislation,209 and are as 
worthy of protection as federal policies regarding trade with for-
eign nations. These policies apply to all tribes, regardless of the 
state in which they are located. Allowing a state to interfere with 
the purpose or uniform effect of these policies would be inconsis-
tent with Congress's power to "regulate Commerce ... with the 
Indian tribes."21o In addition, as in foreign commerce, dual tax 
burdens can be particularly dangerous since they can impair, or 
destroy, commerce between the taxing entities. The nature of 
tribal economies makes this a particularly acute problem in the 
Indian commerce context. For example, in the Chemehuevi case, 
the bulk of the revenues of the Tribe are not generated through 
transactions between the Tribe and its own members, but 
through transactions between the Tribe and non-members who 
are, for the most part, non-Indians residing off the reserva-
tion.:m It therefore becomes critical for the development and en-
hancement of the reservation economy that these transactions 
are not subjected to any state action which could stymie the 
Tribe's efforts to generate revenue and provide essential govern-
mental services. 
C. ApPLICATION OF THE JAPAN LINE, LTD. TEST 
The utility of the Japan Line, Ltd. test may be demon-
strated by analysing the facts of the Chemehuevi case under 
each of the six steps. 
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
209. See, e.g., The Indian Financing Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982 & Supp. II). 
210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
211. In September 1981, the Tribe commissioned the Survey Research Center at the 
University of California at Berkeley to design and conduct a survey to determine the 
effect of imposing California's cigarette tax on sales of cigarettes sold and taxed by the 
Tribe on their reservation. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 3. The district court 
used the results of this survey in making its determination. The survey results showed 
that over 75'}(. of the cigarette transactions were between non-residents and the Tribe. 
Declaration of Robert Posner at 6-7, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of 
Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983). 
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1. Nexus 
Cigarettes purchased and consumed on the Chemehuevi 
Reservation are also purchased and consumed within the bor-
ders of the state of California. A significant number of purchas-
ers are California residents who would likely consume the ciga-
rettes purchased on the reservation elsewhere within the state. 
Thus, there is clearly a nexus between the activity to be taxed 
and the taxing entity. 
2. Apportionment 
This test is of fundamental importance to any commerce 
clause analysis. As the Court in Japan Line, Ltd. said: 
It is a commonplace of constitutional jurispru-
dence that multiple taxation may well be offen-
sive to the Commerce Clause. In order to prevent 
multiple taxation of interstate commerce, this 
Court has required that taxes be apportioned 
among taxing jurisdictions, so that no instrumen-
tality of commerce is subjected to more than one 
tax on its full value.212 
In this case, the state seeks to tax the full value of the privi-
lege of importing, marketing and using cigarettes within the 
state. Since the Tribe also seeks to tax this full value, a dual tax 
burden on cigarette sales is created. Ordinarily, the state appor-
tions its tax by granting a credit to purchasers for use taxes paid 
to other states. The state has refused, however, to grant tribal 
purchasers a similar credit for tribal taxes paid. Thus, in 
Chemehuevi, the state has not apportioned its tax. 
3. Discrimination 
The state tax here discriminates against Indian cigarette 
sales as opposed to interstate or intrastate sales. In the case of 
intrastate sales, the state tax alone applies. If the sale is inter-
state, then the purchaser is given credit for the amount of taxes 
paid to the state in which they purchased the cigarettes, pro-
212. 441 U.S. at 446-47 (citations omitted). 
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vided that state is a member of the Multi-State Tax Compact. 
In any event, out-of-state purchasers of four hundred cigarettes 
or less (two cartons) are exempt from the California tax. The 
state does not grant such a credit to tribal sales, thus these sales 
are taxed twice: once by the tribe and again by the state. This 
increases the price and deters consumers from purchasing ciga-
rettes on the reservation. 
The Supreme Court's language in Colville should be taken 
into account here. To wit, if the purchases which are deterred by 
the imposition of the state tax exist solely because the tribe is 
marketing, or, presumably, purchasers are seeking, an exemption 
from state taxation, such discrimination is permissible. If, how-
ever, sales are deterred which "would occur on the reservation 
because of its location and because of the efforts of the Tribes in 
importing and marketing the cigarettes,"1I13 then such discrimi-
nation is impermissible. The district court found that the tribe 
was marketing more than a tax exemption.214 Therefore, the 
state tax is discriminatory. 
4. Relation to State Services 
Although the state does provide some services to the reser-
vation, they are only tangentially related, both in scope and 
amount, to the use and consumption of cigarettes. The state 
provides roads leading to, and two miles within, the reservation, 
which allow visitors and residents access to the reservation.21Ii 
The state also provides, in conjunction with federal and local 
governments, funds for the operation of schools for reservation 
children, and provides transportation to the school outside the 
reservation.218 Of the revenue it collects from its cigarette tax, 
the state returns thirty percent to local governments.217 Under 
the current statutory scheme, none of these monies are distrib-
uted to the Tribe.218 Thus, although the maintenance of roads 
allow potential cigarette purchasers to reach the fringes of the 
213. 447 u.s. at 158. 
214. Memorandum and Order at 35-36. 
215. [d. at 37; Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 3. 
216. Memorandum and Order at 37. 
217. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30462 (West 1979). These funds are not required to be 
used for any purpose. although they may be used for the general welfare of the state. [d. 
218. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 2. 
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reservation, there is no evidence to suggest that state cigarette 
tax revenues are ever used to maintain those roads, nor to pay 
the operating expenses of local schools. Furthermore, these ser-
vices form only the smallest part of the value which might be 
generated by the privilege of using cigarettes within the state. 
Therefore, the state cigarette tax can be said to not be fairly 
related to the services provided to the Tribe. 
5. Risk of Multiple Taxation 
Unlike in Japan Line, Ltd., the risk of multiple taxation 
can be completely eliminated by apportionment. In Japan Line, 
Ltd., there was no qualified tribunal which could apportion the 
taxes between a state and a foreign government, nor could the 
Court control whether or not a foreign nation taxed the full 
value.219 Here, a court would have the benefit of comprehensive 
federal regulation of Indian tribes and would have the power to 
apportion taxes between the Tribe and the state in accord with 
the preeminent federal scheme. Furthermore, any multiple tax 
burden could be eliminated if the state granted the Tribe a 
credit similar to the one it grants sister states. If no credit is 
given then multiple taxation is virtually guaranteed. 
6. Uniformity of Federal Regulation 
There is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the re-
duction in reservation sales which would result from the imposi-
tion of the state tax on top of the tribal tax would impair the 
Tribe's ability to be economically self-sufficient and to provide 
essential government services on the reservation.220 The imposi-
tion of the state tax interferes with the successful accomplish-
ment of the federal purpose221 and is contrary to federal policy. 
Allowing the tax to stand would be inconsistent with the plenary 
power of Congress to regulate Indian commerce, and would 
threaten Congress's overriding objective that all tribes attain ec-
219. 441 U.S. at 454-55. 
220. The survey found that 55% of resident and 38% of non·resident purchasers 
would buy fewer cigarettes if the price were raised by the amount of the California tax. 
Declaration of Robert Posner at 6-7. This constitutes a substantial portion of the Tribe's 
business. 
221. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983). 
37
Marston et al.: Indian Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
242 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. .16:205 
onomic independence. Such interference would therefore affect 
the uniform application of federal Indian policy. . 
D. EVALUATION 
The foregoing application of a commerce clause analysis is 
not only consistent with preemption and infringement analysis, 
but provides an easier framework for application by the courts. 
Such an analysis weighs the legitimate interests of the tribal, 
state and federal governments as suggested by Colville, yet forti-
fies federal control over Indian affairs by grounding it in the spe-
cific constitutional dictates of the Indian commerce clause. Such 
an analysis seems particularly appropriate when the commercial 
activities of Indian tribes are in issue. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit, on appeal from the district court, failed 
to reach the commerce clause issue in Chemehuevi, finding that 
the incidence of the tax under California law fell on the Tribe, 
not on the non-Indian purchaser.222 This conclusion has been 
summarily reversed by the Supreme Court.223 It therefore re-
mains for the Ninth Circuit to deal with the issues left un-
resolved in its original opinion, including those raised by this ar-
ticle,224 and to correct the errors of the district court. 
In addressing these issues, the Ninth Circuit will be unable 
to avoid examination of the reserved power of the Indian com-
merce clause. The Supreme Court has specifically preserved the 
clause for a special purpose: to prevent undue discrimination 
222. 757 F.2d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985). 
223. 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985) per curiam. The Court's summary disposition dealt only 
with the issue of the legal incidence of the tax, and did not mention the commerce clause 
issues. There were four dissents. Stevens, J. criticized the Court for taking it upon itself 
to interpret the California statute, arguing that the Courts of Appeal are much more 
adept at interpreting the law of the state in which they sit. [d. at 291 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). He would have remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration pur-
suant to the Court's opinion. Id. Marshall, J. would have allowed argument on the case. 
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Blackmun, J. would have given the case plenary considera-
tion. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Brennan, J. would have denied certiorari. [d. 
224. Timely appeal from the district court was taken on the commerce clause issues, 
but the Ninth Circuit did not address them. 757 F.2d at 1057. Those issues are now 
before the Ninth Circuit. 
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against, or burdens on, Indian commerce.2211 The clause becomes 
particularly relevant in the Chemehuevi case, where an Indian 
tribe has taken advantage of its geographical resources and cre-
ated a commercial venture with the potential of rendering the 
tribe economically self-sufficient. This potential exists only be-
cause of the efforts of the Tribe and the assistance of the federal 
government. Here, the federal government has exercised its his-
torical perogative under the Indian commerce clause in stimulat-
ing and regulating Indian commerce; an assertion of state au-
thority must be viewed against any interference with the 
accomplishment of this federal purpose.226 
The commerce clause analysis presented above is particu-
larly well suited to deal with the issues that arise when a state 
seeks to tax an Indian commercial enterprise operated under the 
auspices of the federal government. It would be most appropri-
ate for the Ninth Circuit to consider such an analysis, along with 
the preemption and Indian sovereignty models, when it once 
again addresses the Chemehuevi case.227 
225. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 157 (1980). In fact, in a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, Queets Band of Indians 
v. Wash., the court looked to the Indian commerce clause to determine the validity of a 
state motor vehicle licensing requirement as applied to vehicles licensed by the tribe. 
The divided court found that the licensing law placed only a minimal burden upon the 
tribe, and did not unduly discriminate against the tribe in violation of the Indian com-
merce clause. 765 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985). The court went on to find that the 
state law was preempted by the tribe's exercise of its own licensing power, as delegated 
by the federal government. Id. at 1408-09. The Queets case was subsequently vacated 
and withdrawn upon a joint motion of the parties due to pending legislative action. 783 
F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1986). 
226. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983). 
227. As this article was going to press, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in 
Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1986). In that case, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the State of Washington could regulate and tax tribal liquor 
sales to non-Indians. Id. at 724. This case did not involve the commerce clause issues 
raised in Chemehueui and discussed in this article, but applied the more common pre-
emption and tribal sovereignty analyses. 
The result may be distinguished from the Chemehueui case in two important ways. 
One, this case involved liquor sales, and area where Congress has exercised its plenary 
power and delegated regulatory authority to the states, by 18 U.S.C. § 1161. See Rice v. 
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). Second, the district court in Squaxin Island Tribe found 
that the value being marketed by the tribe was solely an exemption from state taxation. 
Squaxin Island Tribe at 720. The Supreme Court ruled in Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), that the marketing of a 
tax exemption alone was insufficient to overcome otherwise valid state interests. Id. at 
157. The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that Washington's laws were not preempted 
by federal law nor did they infringe upon the tribe's right of self-government. Squaxin 
Island Tribe at 719-20 & nn. 6-7. 
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LACEY ACT APPLIES TO INDIANS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Sohappy,1 the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the convictions of thirteen Indian defendants for violating Lacey 
Act2 prohibitions against transporting, selling, or acquiring fish 
taken or possessed in violation of Indian tribal law, or state law.s 
Upholding the application of the Lacey Act, the court rejected 
defendants' argument that application of the Act to Indian de-
fendants who violated tribal law would amount to an abrogation 
of the treaty reserved rights of the defendants' tribes to control 
and regulate Indian fishing. 
In the spring of 1982, in Cooks Landing, Washington and in 
Celilo, Oregon, defendants caught and sold fish outside the sea-
sons prescribed by tribal and state law, and sold ceremonial fish 
in violation of other tribal and state regulations.4 Defendants 
were convicted under the Lacey Act and appealed, contending 
that the Lacey Act prohibitions applied only to non-Indians,1I 
that the government failed to prove that the offenses occurred 
1. 770 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1985); (perChoy, J.; the other panel members were Ander-
son, J., and Tang, J.). 
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1982). 
3. 770 F.2d at 818. 
4. Id. at 817. 
5. Defendants contended that the Lacey Act prohibitions apply only to non-Indians 
because federal prosecution of Indians for violations of tribal fishing law violates Indian 
sovereignty and Indian treaty reserved fishing rights. Id. 
245 
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within Indian country, and that the trial judge improperly de-
nied them a meaningful chance to challenge the validity of the 
state regulations subsumed under the Lacey Act prosecutions.6 
II. BACKGROUND 
The primary purpose in enacting the Lacey Act was to curb 
trafficking in illegally acquired wildlife,' and to allow the federal 
government to provide more adequate support for the full range 
of laws that protect wildlife.8 As such, the Act provides that it is 
unlawful for any person to transport, sell, or acquire fish taken 
in violation of Indian tribal law or state law.9 
The Act also explicitly disclaims any intention to repeal, su-
persede, or modify any right, privilege, or immunity reserved or 
established pursuant to treaty pertaining to any Indian tribe.10 
Furthermore, the Act includes violations of tribal law only to the 
extent that such offenses occur within Indian country.l1 
The applicability of federal law to Indians on reservations 
received attention from the Ninth Circuit in two recent cases. In 
United States u. Jackson,12 the court addressed whether an In-
dian who hunted on his reservation in violation of a tribal ordi-
nance could be prosecuted in federal court under a federal stat-
6. [d. at 817, 818. Also before the court, was the government's cross appeal from the 
district judge's decision to grant a motion for a change of venue from Washington to Los 
Angeles due to massive publicity and prejudice in Washington and Oregon against In-
dian treaty fisherman. Since the court affirmed the convictions, the cross appeal was not 
addressed. [d. at 818. 
7. [d. at 819. 
8. [d. at 821 (quoting S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981) reprinted in 
1981 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1748, 1751). 
9. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 provides: 
It is unlawful for any person-
(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or 
purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken or possessed in 
violation of any ... Indian tribal law; 
(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or 
purchase in interstate or foreign commerce-
(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or 
sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State .... 
16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1982). 
10. [d. § 3378(c)(2). 
11. [d. § 3371(c). 
12. 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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ute prohibiting hunting on Indian reservations. 13 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 1" According to the court, the inherent sover-
eignty Indian tribes possessed over their internal affairs was 
subject to congressional defeasance, 11) but there was nothing in 
the legislative history, nor any case law, to support the proposi-
tion that Congress intended that statute to apply to Indians on 
their own reservations. 16 
In United States v. Farris,17 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
conviction of Indians for the violation of gambling provisions in 
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.16 According to the 
Farris court, federal laws generally applicable throughout the 
United States apply with equal force to Indians on reserva-
tions. 19 The court recognized the existence of three exceptions to 
this rule: (1) where there is self-governance in purely intramural 
affairs, (2) where a statute abrogated rights guaranteed by 
treaty, and (3) where it could be proven that Congress did not 
intend the law to apply to Indians. Appellants were found not to 
be within any of those exceptions.20 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The court began its analysis of defendants' claim by focus-
ing upon the issue of whether the Lacey Act prohibitions applied 
to Indians as well as non-Indians.21 This issue was accordingly 
divided into two sub-parts: (1) whether the Indian tribes had a 
treaty reserved right to exclusive jurisdiction over tribal law of-
fenses committed by Indians; and (2) whether Congress in-
tended all persons, including Indians, to be subject to the Lacey 
13. Id. The statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982) which provided penalties for 
"[w]hoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon 
any land that belongs to any ... Indian tribe ... for the purpose of hunting .... " Id. 
14. 600 F.2d at 1288. 
15. Id. at 1285. 
16. Id. at 1287. 
17. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981). 
18. 624 F.2d at 898. The statute involved was 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982) which pro-
vided penalties for illegal gambling businesses. 
19. 624 F.2d at 893. 
20. Id. at 893, 894. 
21. 770 F.2d at 818. 
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Act prohibitions.22 
A. TREATY RESERVED RIGHT TO EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 
The examination of defendants' assertion of a treaty re-
served right to exclusive jurisdiction began with an attempt to 
distinguish the present case from United States v. Jackson. 23 
According to the court, under Jackson exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion was retained in offenses committed by one Indian against 
another Indian.24 However, the present case involved an applica-
tion of the Lacey Act to an offense committed by an Indian in 
violation of both tribal law and state law. The court reasoned 
that fishing offenses were not purely intra-Indian matters, but 
impacted upon federal and state interests, including the inter-
ests of non-Indians, as well. Thus, Jackson did not support the 
theory that the tribes retained by treaty exclusive jurisdiction 
over Indians committing fishing offenses.21i 
Next, the court rejected defendants' claim that the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction over Indians who violated their own tribal 
law would effectively destroy tribal sovereignty as guaranteed by 
treaty.2S While recognizing the importance of independent tribal 
control, th'e court stated that "Indian sovereignty is necessarily 
limited and must not conflict with the overriding sovereignty of 
the United States."27 Furthermore, the exercise of federal juris-
diction under the Lacey Act was not disruptive of tribal author-
ity, but supported tribal laws by authorizing federal penalties 
for their violation.28 
Finally, the court concluded that Congress intended the 
Lacey Act to apply to Indians.29 Thus, the statutory language 
disclaiming any intent to abrogate treaty rights could only be 
reconciled with such an intention if there was no treaty right to 
exclusive jurisdiction.80 
22. [d. 
23. 600 F.2d 1283 (9th CiT. 1979). 
24. 770 F.2d at 818. 
25. [d. at 819. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. (citing United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1230 (9th CiT. 1980)). 
28. 770 F.2d at 819, 820. 
29. [d. at 820. 
30. [d. 
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B. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO INCLUDE INDIANS 
While the language of the Lacey Act prohibitions specifi-
cally refers to "any person," defendants contended that Con-
gress meant to include only non-Indians.31 According to the de-
fendants, tribal law was' incorporated into the Act to provide a 
mechanism for enforcement of tribal law against non-Indians.32 
However, the court found nothing in the legislative history to 
support such a theory.33 Furthermore, the Act makes it unlawful 
for "any person" to traffic not only in fish obtained in violation 
of tribal law, but also in fish obtained in violation of federal and 
state law as well. Yet, under defendants' theory, Indians would 
be exempt from the prohibitions against trafficking in violation 
of federal or state law, a result that would severely hinder the 
goals set by Congress in enacting the Lacey Act.34 According to 
the court, the Act should apply to Indian offenders as well as to 
non-Indians since Indians who traffic in illegal wildlife impede 
the Lacey Act's goal of wildlife preservation just as much as 
non-Indian traffickers.311 Thus, the court concluded that given 
the congressional goal of preserving wildlife, it was reasonable to 
assume Congress intended the Lacey Act to encompass every-
one, including Indians.36 
In addition to their claim that the Lacey Act prohibitions 
did not apply to Indians, defendants also argued that the gov-
ernment failed to prove that their offenses occurred within In-
dian country, and that they were denied a meaningful chance to 
challenge the validity of state regulations subsumed under the 
Lacey Act.3? Both claims were quickly rejected. The court found 
that the government adequately demonstrated that Celilo and 
Cooks Landing are within Indian country, since both areas are 
owned by the United States and held for the benefit and use of 
the various Columbia River treaty tribes.38 The court also found 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 821. It is generally recognized that Indian tribes do not have inherent 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW, 246-57 (1982) (discussing the extent of tribal powers). 




37. Id. at 822. 
38.Id. 
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that although the government had the burden of establishing 
the validity of the state regulations underlying a Lacey Act pros-
ecution, that burden had been met, as the government ade-
quately established the validity of the 1982 spring season ban on 
commercial fishing. 39 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Sohappy, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the convictions of Indian defendants for violating the Lacey 
Act.40 The court rejected defendants' argument that such a deci-
sion abrogated the treaty reserved right of their tribes to control 
and regulate fishing.41 While the court recognized the existence 
of a treaty right to take fish at all usual and accustomed places, 
it found no treaty reserved right to exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the enforcement of fishing laws against Indians.42 
In applying the Lacey Act to Indian defendants, the Ninth 
Circuit has indicated that there are few instances when an In-
dian tribe will retain exclusive jurisdiction over its members. 
The court has limited its holding in United States v. Jackson, 
and embraced its position in United States v. Farris. Thus, the 
court has subtly shifted its position from presuming tribal au-
thority unless congressional intent clearly abrogates such au-
thority, to presuming the applicability of federal law, unless 
there is a specific treaty reserved right to exclusive jurisdiction. 
Steven White* 
39. [d. at 825. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. at 818. 
42. [d. at 820. 
"Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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